A number of works have focused on the setting where an adversary tampers with the shares of a secret sharing scheme. This includes literature on verifiable secret sharing, algebraic manipulation detection(AMD) codes, and, error correcting or detecting codes in general. In this work, we initiate a systematic study of what we call non-malleable secret sharing. Very roughly, the guarantee we seek is the following: the adversary may potentially tamper with all of the shares, and still, either the reconstruction procedure outputs the original secret, or, the original secret is "destroyed" and the reconstruction outputs a string which is completely "unrelated" to the original secret. Recent exciting work on non-malleable codes in the split-state model led to constructions which can be seen as 2-out-of-2 non-malleable secret sharing schemes. These constructions have already found a number of applications in cryptography. We investigate the natural question of constructing t-out-of-n non-malleable secret sharing schemes. Such a secret sharing scheme ensures that only a set consisting of t or more shares can reconstruct the secret, and, additionally guarantees non-malleability under an attack where potentially every share maybe tampered with. Techniques used for obtaining split-state non-malleable codes (or 2-out-of-2 non-malleable secret sharing) are (in some form) based on twosource extractors and seem not to generalize to our setting.
unconditional and the adversary is allowed to jointly-tamper subsets of up to (t −1) shares. We believe that the techniques introduced in our construction may be of independent interest.
Inspired by the well studied problem of perfectly secure message transmission introduced in the seminal work of Dolev et. al (J. of ACM'93), we also initiate the study of non-malleable message transmission. Non-malleable message transmission can be seen as a natural generalization in which the goal is to ensure that the receiver either receives the original message, or, the original message is essentially destroyed and the receiver receives an "unrelated" message, when the network is under the influence of an adversary who can byzantinely corrupt all the nodes in the network. As natural applications of our non-malleable secret sharing schemes, we propose constructions for non-malleable message transmission.
CCS CONCEPTS
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INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a fundamental primitive in cryptography which allows a dealer to distribute shares of a secret among several parties, such that only authorized subsets of parties can recover the secret; the secret is "hidden" from all the unauthorized set of parties. Shamir [29] and Blakley [6] initiated the study of secret sharing by constructing threshold secret sharing schemes that only allows at least t-out-of-n parties to reconstruct the secret.
Secret sharing schemes as envisioned originally were concerned with the privacy of the secret, however, what if the primary goal of the adversary is to tamper with the secret instead? Here one could ask for a number of different guarantees. For example, one could ask that the correct secret is recovered even when some number of shares are arbitrarily corrupted. Concepts from error correcting codes have been useful in obtaining such robust secret sharing schemes. Similar related guarantees can be found in the lines of work on: error detecting codes such as algebraic manipulation detection(AMD) codes [10] , and, verifiable secret sharing [27] . A more detailed overview of the related works can be found later in this section.
Non-malleable secret sharing. In this work, we initiate a systematic study of what we call non-malleable secret sharing. Very roughly, the guarantee we seek is the following: the adversary may potentially tamper with all of the shares, and still, either the reconstruction procedure outputs the original secret, or, the original secret is "destroyed" and the reconstruction outputs a string which is completely "unrelated" to the original secret. This is a natural guarantee which is inspired by applications in cryptography. Before giving more details, a discussion of the relationship of this notion with split state non-malleable codes is in order.
Non-malleable codes in the split state model. In a beautiful work Dziembowski et al. [17] introduced non-malleable codes and showed the existence of such codes against a broad family of tampering functions. Non-malleable codes guarantee that tampering with the code can only cause the reconstruction procedure to either output the original message or an "unrelated" one. A number of subsequent works have continued to study non-malleable codes in various tampering models. Perhaps the most well-known of these models is the so called split state model. At a high level this means that the codeword has two parts and the adversary is allowed to tamper with both the parts arbitrarily and independently. This model was proposed by Liu and Lysyanskaya [25] who also presented a construction based on (strong) cryptographic assumptions.
Constructing split state non-malleable codes without cryptographic assumptions proved to be surprisingly hard. Dziembowski et al. [14] proposed a construction which could encode single bit messages. A subsequent brilliant lines of works resulted in constructions for multi-bit messages as well [1, 7, 24] .
Split state non-malleable codes do not explicitly require that the message remain a secret given only one of the two states. However, it is not difficult to see that any 2 split-state non-malleable code is also a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme. Thus, the perspective we follow in our work would be to view the above constructions as 2-out-of-2 non-malleable secret sharing schemes. Note that such an implication may not hold if the number of states is more than 2. To see this, consider a contrived example of a 3 split-state nonmalleable code where the encoding functions encodes the message using a 2 split-state non-malleable code to obtain the first two states and outputs the message (in the clear) in the third state. The decoding function simply ignores the third state and uses the first two states to decode the message. Such a construction is a valid 3 split-state non-malleable code that is not a 3-out-of-3 secret sharing scheme (in fact, it has no secrecy at all).
Even though non-malleable code is a relatively new primitive, it has already found a number of applications in cryptography including in tamper-resilient cryptography [17] , designing multi-prover interactive proof systems [18] and obtaining efficient encryption schemes [9] . Very recently, non-malleable codes in the split-state model were used as 2-out-of-2 non-malleable secret sharing scheme to obtain 3-round protocol for non-malleable commitments [20] (a problem which was open for a while).
Our Question. We study the following natural question in this work:
Can we get t-out-of-n non-malleable secret sharing schemes in which adversary can tamper (in some form) with all the shares?
As noted before, split state non-malleable codes provide a positive answer to the above question for the special case of t = n = 2. These constructions have already found a number of applications in cryptography. However to our knowledge, a construction for general values of t and n is currently unknown (even from cryptographic assumptions).
The techniques used for obtaining 2-out-of-2 non-malleable secret sharing schemes are, in some form or the other, based on 2-source (or multi-source) extractors, and, seem not to generalize to our case. Almost by definition, all the sources are required to compute the extractor output (which, presumably would be used in the reconstruction phase of the non-malleable secret sharing). Such an idea would fail in our setting where all the sources (i.e., shares) may not be available during reconstruction.
Existing secret-sharing schemes. Most of the secret sharing schemes known are linear [3, chapter 4] and have nice algebraic and geometric properties, which are harnessed to obtain efficient sharing and reconstruction procedures. Non-malleable secret sharing schemes on the other hand cannot be linear. To see this, consider a linear secret sharing scheme, in which the secret is a linear combination of the authorized shares. Now if an adversary multiplies each of the authorized shares by 2, the secret, which is a linear combination, also gets multiplied by 2 and non-malleability is lost. In fact, it is easy to see that for any authorized set of shares of linear schemes, the adversary can add an arbitrary value of its choice to the secret by changing only one of the shares. Indeed, the malleability of linear secret sharing schemes, such as polynomials based Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] , forms the basis of secure multi-party computation protocols [5] . For our purposes, any such alteration is an "attack" and we try to build secret sharing schemes that necessarily prohibit any such attacks.
Our Results
As our first technical contribution, we construct t-out-of-n nonmalleable secret sharing scheme that allows a computationally unbounded adversary to arbitrarily tamper with each of the shares independently. We note that prior to this work, even for computationally bounded adversaries, no threshold (i.e. t-out-of-n) nonmalleable secret sharing schemes were known.
(Informal) Theorem 1. For any threshold t ≥ 2, any number of parties n ≥ t, there exists an efficient 1 t-out-of-n statistical secret sharing scheme that is statistically non-malleable against a computationally unbounded adversary who tampers each of the shares arbitrarily and independently.
In the above model, the adversary specifies a separate tampering function for each of the t shares that it tampers with. The reconstruction function takes the t tampered shares and outputs a message (which should either be identical or unrelated to the original one). We refer to this as the individual tampering model. Next, we consider what we call the joint tampering model where the 1 A statistical secret sharing scheme is efficient if the sharing and reconstruction functions run in poly n, k, log(1/ϵ ) time where k is the size of the message and ϵ > 0 is the statistical error. For concrete parameters, please see section 3. adversary may tamper jointly with several shares. It is easy to see that if the adversary can tamper jointly with t or more shares, it can simply reconstruct the original message, and, replace the original shares with the shares of a related message of its choice. Thus, one could hope to achieve non-malleability only if the adversary can jointly tamper up to t − 1 shares.
As our main technical contribution, we obtain the following result in the joint tampering model.
(Informal) Theorem 2. For any threshold t ≥ 2 and number of parties n ≥ t, there exists an efficient t-out-of-n statistical secret sharing scheme that is statistically non-malleable against a computationally unbounded adversary who chooses any arbitrary authorized set of t shares, partitions it into two unequal non-empty subsets 2 and then jointly tampers the shares in each of these subsets arbitrarily and independently.
While theorem 1 is subsumed by theorem 2, it nonetheless serves as a useful starting point for illustrating our ideas. We also remark that our construction for individual tampering features a significantly better rate than the one for joint tampering.
Leakage Resilient Non-Malleable Codes. To achieve our results on joint tampering, we need non-malleable codes that satisfy a strong leakage-resilience requirement. Specifically, we need 2 split-state non-malleable codes, where the tampering of first part (i.e. state) not only depends on the first part, but also on bounded information (leakage) from the second part. The non-trivial part is that the bound on the bits of leakage from the second part can be as large as the size of the first part. Unfortunately, all known constructions of split-state non-malleable codes [1, 7, 14, 24] (even leakage-resilient ones [2, 19] ) have two parts of equal size and can be trivially broken in our leakage model. We construct such codes and believe that it will be useful in other cryptographic applications. 3 (Informal) Theorem 3. For any polynomial p, there exists an efficient coding scheme that encodes a message into two parts (l, r ) and is statistically non-malleable against an adversary who tampers the first share as f (l, leak(r )) and the second share as д(r ), where f and д are arbitrary tampering functions and leak(r ) is an arbitrary function that outputs p(|l |) bits of information about r .
Non-Malleable Message Transmission. As an application of nonmalleable secret sharing schemes, we initiate the study of nonmalleable message transmission. While the existing works on message transmission have been primarily concerned with ensuring reliability and secrecy of the message when a bounded number of nodes are corrupted [13, 21, 22, 30, 31] , non-malleable message transmission tries to ensure non-malleability against adversaries which can corrupt the entire network. In other words, it ensures that the receiver either receives the original message, or, the original message is essentially destroyed and the receiver receives an "unrelated" message, when the network is under the influence of an adversary who can execute arbitrary protocol on each of the nodes in the network (apart from the sender and the receiver).
We even allow the adversary to add a bounded number of arbitrary hidden links which it can use in addition to the original links for communicating amongst corrupt nodes. We now informally define non-malleable paths to help us obtain our protocol which not only ensures non-malleability against such an adversary, but also guarantees that only the receiver learns the secret. For a network represented by an undirected graph G, let G ′ be the induced subgraph of G with sender S and R removed. We define a collection of paths from S to R to be non-malleable if in the induced subgraph G ′ any node is reachable by nodes present on at most one of these paths.
(Informal) Lemma 1. In any network, with a designated sender S and receiver R, if there exists a collection of n non-malleable paths from S to R, then non-malleable secure message transmission protocol is possible with respect to an adversary which adds at most n − 3 arbitrary hidden links in the network and byzantinely corrupts all nodes other than S and R 4 .
We have used our n-out-of-n scheme to arrive at the above result. We can use our threshold non-malleable secret sharing schemes, and extend the above protocol to additionally ensure that message is correctly recovered in case the adversary only crashes a bounded number of nodes.
Our Techniques
There are a number of constructions of non-malleable codes in the split-state model, all having intricate proofs of non-malleability [1, 7, 14, 24] . All of these constructions crucially use techniques from 2-source or multi-source extractors. Almost by definition, all the sources are required to compute the extractor output (which, presumably would be used in the reconstruction phase of the nonmalleable code). Such an idea would fail in our setting where all the sources (i.e., shares) may not be available during reconstruction.
Non-Malleable Secret Sharing with respect to individual tampering. We highlight the main technical ideas, while trying to build a t-outof-n secret sharing that is non-malleable with respect to individual tampering. As a building block, we use a split-state non-malleable code that encodes a message into two parts, say l and r . As these codes are only secure if the two parts are tampered independently, we have to ensure that independent tampering of shares of our scheme can be transformed to an independent tampering of l and r . As a first attempt, such independence can be achieved if for a given set of t shares used for reconstruction, the first share has information of l, while the other t − 1 shares has information about r . However upon realizing that any set of t shares should allow for reconstruction, such approaches break down. This hints towards a possible approach in which each of n shares of the secret sharing scheme has shares of both l and r . We describe the two main ideas behind our construction:
(1) Getting non-malleability from secret sharing schemes with different parameters. We observe that two secret sharing schemes requiring different number of shares for reconstruction have "some" non-malleability with respect to each other. In more detail, suppose the adversary is given shares of a secret s 1 under a t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme, and, is required to output shares of a secret s 2 under (t − 1)-out-of-n secret sharing scheme, such that each share of s 2 is obtained by tampering a single share of s 1 . Then, we can conclude that s 2 is independent of s 1 . This is because (t − 1) shares of s 2 can depend only upon (t − 1) shares of s 1 (which in turn would have no information about s 1 ). This can be also be seen as concluding that polynomials of different degree have "some" non-malleability w.r.t. each other. This is a very natural (and yet powerful) idea, and to our knowledge has not been exploited before. Now we provide further details. We wish to build a t-out-of-n non-malleable secret sharing scheme. Say t > 2. To share m, we encode m using the encoder of non-malleable code to obtain l, r . We share l using a t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme to obtain n shares l 1 , . . . , l n . We share r using a 2-out-of-n secret sharing scheme to obtain n shares r 1 , . . . , r n . We set each of the n shares as share i ← (l i , r i ). For reconstruction, given any t tampered shares of the form share i ← ( l i , r i ), we reconstruct l using the t shares. In the reconstruction of r , we use only 2 shares, which is allowed since r was shared using a 2-out-ofn scheme. We notice, that in case of individual tampering, the reconstructed r can only depend on 2 shares of l, and is independent of the value of l. This follows from the security of the t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme when t > 2.
(2) Getting non-malleability from leakage-resilient secret sharing. Using the previous technique only gives us one direction of independence, that is, r cannot depend on the value of l. We need a new approach to ensure that l, which is reconstructed using all the t shares, cannot depend on the value of r . Approaches to use the same technique one more time unfortunately fail. To this end, we share r using a leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme (which we construct), which ensures that the secret r is statistically hidden even when each of the n shares of r leak |l | bits of information. More specifically, we define a set of leakage functions, where each function takes as input a share r i and l i to obtain share i ← (l i , r i ), tampers using the tampering function f i to obtain the tampered share i ← f i (share i ), parses share i as l i , r i , and outputs l i as the leakage. The leakage-resilience ensures that r is statistically independent of the joint distribution of n leakages, namely l 1 , . . . , l n . We get the other direction of independence, that is, the reconstructed l is statistically independent of the value r , on observing that any reconstruction function for l only uses values from the joint distribution l 1 , . . . , l n . The k-out-of-n leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme (used as a building block in the above construction) may be a primitive of independent interest. Such a secret sharing scheme guarantees secrecy of the share even if the adversary partitions the n shares into parts of size at most k − 1 and obtains obtains individual leakage from each of the parts. To our knowledge, k-out-of-n leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes have not appeared so far in the literature (although the construction for k = 2 required for this work follows from standard techniques). Observe that this approach fails when t = 2, as we cannot apply the first technique when both the schemes require the same number of shares for reconstruction. To this end, we separately build a 2-outof-n non-malleable secret sharing scheme from standard techniques.
Non-Malleable Secret Sharing with respect to Joint Tampering. Let us try to use our ideas to construct a t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme that is non-malleable against joint tampering. Notice that, in our previous constructions, if we allow the adversary to jointly tamper any two shares then it can simply reconstruct r (which is shared under a 2-out-of-n leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme) and use r to change the shares of l disabling us from obtaining a split-state reduction to the underlying non-malleable code. One way to fix this problem would be to use a k-out-of-n leakage-resilient scheme that ensures secrecy of r against joint-leakage from less than k shares and we might hope to achieve joint tampering of subsets containing less than k shares. Therefore, it appears that the threshold k could be set to a value up to t − 1 allowing for joint tampering of up to t − 2 shares.
Unfortunately, apart from the fact that this approach disallows for joint tampering of t − 1 shares, there is a more fundamental limitation: even when k is less than t, the k tampered shares (used for reconstructing r ) may now depend on all the t shares (of l). In more detail, as our reconstruction procedure will always use the first k 5 out of the t shares to reconstruct r , and if the threshold k is too high, then the adversary may partition the t shares in a way that allows it to make the first k shares depend on all the t shares of l. For example, consider the simple case when k = t − 1 and the adversary tampers the last two shares together, and all other shares individually. In such a situation the first t − 1 tampered shares of r may have information of all the t shares of l (in particular, the tamperedr may depend on l). Towards solving this problem, we take another approach and use the following additional techniques:
(1) Continue using secret-sharing schemes with different parameters for ensuring that tampering of r is independent of l. Without loss of generality we can assume that the adversary partitions the shares into two subsets.
Our key idea will be to choose k s.t. one of the two subsets has full information about r . As r is shared using a k-outof-n secret-sharing scheme, any subset which has at least k shares fixes a value of tamperedr . Moreover, as no subset can have all the t shares, we can argue that the fixed value of tamperedr (for that subset) has to be independent of the value of l. While we partially get one direction of independence, such an approach inherently breaks the other direction of independence required for non-malleability. In particular, the tampering function for the subset containing k shares can simply reconstruct r even if one uses a leakage-resilient secret-sharing scheme. Thus, the tampered shares of l could now depend on r (unlike the previous construction). Thus, it may seem like we have not made any progress.
(2) Getting non-malleability from leakage-resilient nonmalleable codes. Use traditional k-out-of-n secret sharing schemes for sharing r (as opposed to a leakage-resilient one) and instead derive leakage-resilience from the underlying non-malleable code. This allows the tampering of l to potentially depend on O(|l |) bits of information about r (earlier the tampering of l could not depend on even a single bit of r ).
Observe that even if the adversary reconstructs r , and uses its value in tampering the shares of l, the tampered shares of l can only contain a bounded amount of information about r , and we may hope to leverage the leakage-resilience of the underlying non-malleable code that allows for such a bounded amount of leakage from r . To make the above approach work, the leakage must not be a function of l, and tampering of l should only be a function of l and the leakage obtained from r (and not the entire r ). However note that the tampering function gets the entire r as input (since it can reconstruct and obtain r )! We solve this issue by assuming that the two subsets have different sizes and setting k to be 1 + ⌊ t 2 ⌋. Observe that such a setting ensures that exactly one of the two subsets will have k (or more) shares. In other words, r will be hidden in the smaller subset, and therefore, the tampered shares of l of the smaller subset will be independent of the value of r . Now, instead of treating all the t tampered shares of l as leakage from r , we only consider the tampered shares of l present in the larger subset as leakage from r . Notice, as the larger subset has less than t shares, we have ensured that this leakage will be independent of the value of l. The above approach relies on a leakage resilient non-malleable code in the split state model (where the two parts are necessarily of unequal length). All existing non-malleable codes break down in this setting, and, natural approaches to extend them to our setting seem not to work. Towards that end, we propose a new construction based on [7] , and outline our ideas behind it later in this subsection.
(3) The "selective bot" problem. One remaining problem that we ignored in the description of above techniques is the following. Suppose the reconstruction function only uses some fixed k (out of t) shares to reconstruct r . Then what if the adversary partitions in such a way that these k shares are spread across both the subsets? Thus, potentially the tampered versions of these shares (and hence tamperedr ) could depend on all the t shares of l. To solve this problem, our new reconstruction will make use of all the t shares of r and check that they are consistent under a k-out-of-n scheme. The reconstruction procedure outputs ⊥ if the check fails.
Trying to make this idea work, we run into the following "selective bot" problem: to know if our reconstruction outputs ⊥ (bot) or not, all the t tampered shares of r must be used (which in turn may depend overall on all t shares of l). This leads to the following possibility: the probability that the tampered shares reconstruct to ⊥ might depend upon what the original message was. This breaks the non-malleability guarantee of our scheme. Our ideas to solve the problem are as follows:
• Further rely on leakage of the non-malleable codes. Interestingly, we solve this issue by relying on the leakage resilience of the underlying non-malleable code one more time. In particular, we design an efficient randomized protocol for detection of ⊥ with communication complexity much lower than the size of r (if fact, lower than |l | bits). Moreover our protocol only requires sending a single string from the larger subset to the smaller subset, and this communication can be modeled as additional leakage from the r to l. More details follow.
• Interpolate the values of consistent shares. Recall that our sharing procedure shared r using a k-out-of-n Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] . As the larger subset has at least k tampered shares of r , using the properties of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, it is possible to interpolate the unique value of each of the t shares that will be consistent with these k shares. In particular, even if the larger subset has no idea of shares of l in the smaller subset, it knows what the tampered shares of r in the smaller subset would like in case ⊥ does not happen. Lets concatenate these shares (corresponding to the smaller subset) to obtain an "interpolated string". On the other hand, the smaller subset concatenates its share of r (in the same order) to obtain the "real string". Notice that we have reduced the problem of detecting ⊥ to an "easier" problem of detecting inequality in between the two strings.
• Scatter the error and perform random-sampling. Now each of the two subsets encodes its string using some high-distance error-correcting code to scatter the error and guarantee that even if the inputs differed in a single position, the output binary strings will differ in at least a constant fraction of bits. Now notice that comparing the two encodings at a random location will detect any difference (in inputs) with at least a constant probability. In particular, for any ϵ, by executing O(log(1/ϵ)) such checks in parallel, we can reduce the chance of not detecting the ⊥ to lower than ϵ. That is, we can use uniform randomness to sample random locations from the encoded "interpolated string" and send the sampled bits as an additional leakage from (only) r . The other subset can also use the same uniform randomness to sample at exactly the same locations from the encoded "real string" and can detect any ⊥ with probability at least 1 − ϵ, allowing us the invoke the non-malleability of the underlying non-malleable code.
Leakage Resilient Non-Malleable Codes. Unfortunately, all known constructions of 2 split-state statistical non-malleable codes can be trivially broken in our leakage model. All existing constructions use inner-product as a two-source extractor, and further rely on the linearity of inner-product for obtaining an efficient encoding procedure for the non-malleable code. In our leakage-model, the adversary can fully leak one of the sources of the inner-product, and there will be no randomness left to invoke the properties of the two-source extractor. Therefore, in our constructions we need to use some two-source extractor for which the two sources have unequal lengths. While the literature on extractors is very rich, most of the works focus on the improving the parameters of seededextractors (weaker objects than two-source extractors) or improving the parameters for multi-source extractors (which generally have sources of equal length). One notable exception is the beautiful construction of Raz [28] which constructs two-source extractors for uneven length sources. Unfortunately, it does not have the linearity property that has been used for efficient encoding. Another possible way of generating two-source extractors is via generalized left-over hash lemma of Lee et al. [23] . This lemma does not seem to help in obtaining the parameters we seek .
To construct the required leakage-resilient non-malleable code, our starting point would be the non-malleable extractor of Chattopadhyay et al. [7] hereby referred to as the CGL construction. We modify their construction to build the first 2-source non-malleable extractor with uneven length sources. We use the following additional ideas :
• Redesign the advice generator. The CGL construction is based on alternating extraction from 2 sources (with each source representing one part of the code in case of split state of non-mallaeble code). A crucial step in this construction requires constructing an advice generator by "slicing" from each of the two sources. However now one of the "slices" would need to be much longer than the other. This would lead to an unacceptable blow up in the size of the generated advice. To solve this problem, we redesign the construction of the advice generator. The advice that we generate no longer contains the "slices" explicitly. In our advice generator we use Raz's two-source extractor [28] (instead of inner-product), and rely on its "strongness" (and ideas from the beautiful work of Cohen [8] ) for the new analysis.
• Inject leakage-resilience in each step to obtain overall leakage-resilience. After the advice is generated, CGL construction can be seen as a sequential invocations of seeded extractors, where the first seed is generated using another two-source extractor. As extractors are naturally leakageresilient (leakage from the source can be seen as loss of minentropy from the source, and extractors work with smaller min-entropy as well, as observed in [11, 15] ), we adjust the parameters of linear seeded extractors to handle the leakage, and use Raz's extractor to generate the first seed. In this way we achieve global leakage-resilience by achieving leakage-resilience in each of the intermediate steps.
• Redesign the encoding procedure. The encoding procedure of CGL proceeds by randomly sampling all the seeds corresponding to each of the seeded extractors. It then uses the linearity of seeded-extractor to uniformly sample the value of the source given the output and seed . After which, it uses the linearity of inner-product (two-source extractor), to uniformly sample two "slices" which encode the first seed. Unfortunately, we do not know how to uniformly sample from the pre-image of the output of Raz's extractor, and this approach of encoding breaks down. Instead of first sampling all the seeds and then the value of sources, we interleave this process. In particular, we randomly sample the value of these two "slices" (which fixes the first and third seed), and carefully sample (adjust) other sources based on fixed output and randomly chosen value of other seeds. At the same time, using properties of Reed-Solomon codes (extending the technique of [7] ), we show that everything is consistent with the new advice generator.
Open problems. We see this as the beginning of a rich line of research inspired by non-malleable codes. We mention some natural research directions :
• Handing general access structures. An interesting future direction is to consider even more general access structures such as those represented by monotone span programs or even monotone polynomial size circuits.
• More advanced joint-tampering. An even stronger model of joint tampering would be one where the different subset of shares (being jointly tampered) need not be disjoint.
In particular, what if the tampering of any share can depend on any unauthorized set of shares? For the case of t-out-of-n schemes, it allows the tampering of any share to depend on any t-1 (out of n) shares. A construction of even n-outof-n non-malleable secret sharing scheme in this stronger tampering model would be interesting. Another open problem would be to construct t-out-of-n schemes where the adversary can tamper with two subsets of size exactly t 2 6 .
• Construction with improved rate. While our focus has not been to optimize the rate of our constructions, we believe it is an interesting problem to improve the rate of nonmalleable secrets sharing schemes. As our results use natural primitives in a black-box way, an improvement in the construction of these primitives directly improves the rate of the final secret-sharing scheme. It may also be possible to further improve the rate by designing computational non-malleable secret-sharing schemes.
• Explore newer applications. It would be interesting to explore further applications of non-malleable secret sharing.
In particular for non-malleable message transmission, an interesting direction is to assume that the network is synchronous and we can leverage the global clock to achieve non-malleability in a much larger class of graphs (and natural networks).
Paper organization. We formally define non-malleable codes and secret sharing schemes in section 2. We give our construction for the individual tampering model in section 3. As our main result, we construct non-malleable secret sharing schemes against jointtampering in section 4. We present the construction of leakageresilient non-malleable code, non-malleable message transmission and 2-out-of-n non-malleable (resp. leakage-resilient) secret sharing schemes in the full version of this extended abstract.
Related Works. A number of works in the literature ensure that the correct secret is recovered even when some number of shares are arbitrarily corrupted. Concepts from error correcting codes have been useful in obtaining such schemes. McEliece and Sarwate [26] noticed that, the polynomial based Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] is very closely related to Reed-Solomon codes, and allows for correct reconstruction of the secret even if less than one third of the shares are altered.
In a seminal work [27] , Rabin and Ben-Or introduced verifiable secret sharing, which allowed the adversary to tamper almost half the shares, and still ensured that the adversary cannot cause the reconstruction procedure to output an incorrect message (except with exponentially small error probability). Cramer et al. [10] , in a beautiful work introduced algebraic manipulation detection(AMD) codes and gave almost optimal constructions for them. These codes allow the adversary to "blindly" add any value to the codeword, and ensure that any such algebraic tampering will be detected with high probability. Moreover, they elegantly used these codes to arrive at robust linear secret sharing schemes, that allowed the adversary to arbitrarily tamper with any unauthorized set of shares, with a guarantee that any such tampering will be detected with high probability. As an example, consider the n-out-of-n linear secret sharing scheme constructed using AMD codes that allows the adversary to tamper n − 1 shares arbitrarily, and ensures that any such tampering will be detected with high probability. The notion of non-malleability was introduced in the seminal work of Dolev et al. [12] .
DEFINITIONS
We use capital letters to denote distributions and their support, and corresponding small letters to denote a sample from the distribution. Let 
Sometimes we represent the same using D 1 ≈ ϵ D 2 . 
Non-Malleable Codes
           c ← Enc(m) c ← f(c) m ← Dec(c) Output :m           which is random variable over the randomness of the encoding function Enc. We say a coding scheme (Enc, Dec) is ϵ-non-malleable w.r.t F if for each f ∈ F , there exists a distribution D f (corresponding to the simulator) over M ∪ {same * , ⊥} such that, for all m ∈ M, we have that the statistical distance between Tamper f m and Sim f m = m ← D f Output : m ifm = same * , orm, otherwise is at most ϵ. Additionally, D f should be efficiently samplable given oracle access to f(.).
Secret Sharing Schemes
The following definitions are inspired from the survey [4] . (1) Correctness. The secret can be reconstructed by any t-outof-n parties. That is, for any set T ⊆ [n] such that |T | ≥ t, there exists a deterministic reconstruction function Rec :
(over the randomness of the Sharing function) (2) Statistical Privacy. Any collusion of less than t parties should have "almost" no information about the underlying secret. More formally, for any unauthorized set U ⊆ [n] such that |U | < t, and for every pair of secrets a, b ∈ M, for any distinguisher D with output in {0, 1}, the following holds :
The special case of ϵ = 0, is known as Perfect Privacy. We also state (Share, Rec) as a (t, n, ϵ)-secret sharing scheme.
Definition 2.6. (Non-Malleable Secret Sharing Schemes) Let (Share, Rec) be a (t, n, ϵ)-secret sharing scheme for message space M. Let F be some family of tampering functions. For each f ∈ F , m ∈ M and authorized set T ⊆ [n] containing t indices, define the tampering experiment
which is a random variable over the randomness of the sharing function Share. We say that the (t, n, ϵ)-secret sharing scheme, (Share, Rec) is ϵ ′ -non-malleable w.r.t F if for each f ∈ F and authorized set T containing t indices, there exists a distribution SD f,T (corresponding to the simulator) over M ∪ {same * , ⊥} such that, for all m ∈ M , we have that the statistical distance between is at most ϵ ′ . Additionally, SD f,T should be efficiently samplable given oracle access to f(.)
NON-MALLEABLE SECRET SHARING AGAINST INDIVIDUAL TAMPERING
In this section we show how to convert any t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme into a non-malleable one against an adversary who arbitrarily tampers each of the shares independently. We have tried to keep the construction as modular as possible, and have used various components in a black-box way. This approach not only makes the construction more accessible, but also enables one to improve the final construction by improving one or more of the sub-components. We begin with formal definition of the split-state (individual) tampering family:
Split-State Tampering Family F spl it n . Let Share be a sharing function that takes as input a message m ∈ M and outputs shares shares ∈ ⊗ i ∈[n] S i . Parse the output shares into n blocks, namely share 1 , share 2 , . . . , share n where each share i ∈ S i . For each i ∈ [n], let f i : S i → S i be an arbitrary tampering function, that takes as input share i , the i t h share. Let F spl it n be a family of such n functions (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ).
Note that above definition is written with respect to a sharing function. It is just for ease of presentation, we can use this family of tampering functions with respect to a coding scheme, by treating the encoding procedure as a sharing function. We also recall a lemma, which can be used to show that every 2 split-state nonmalleable code is a 2-out-of-2 non-malleable secret sharing scheme. then (Enc, Dec) is also a (2, 2ϵ)-secret sharing scheme that is ϵ-nonmalleable w.r.t. , where Enc acts as a sharing function.
Leakage Family. As one of our building blocks, we use a 2-out-ofn leakage-resilient secret-sharing scheme, we begin with the formal definition of such schemes and then formally state our split-state leakage family.
Definition 3.2. (Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing Schemes)
Let M be any message space. Let L be some family of leakage functions. We say that the (t, n, ϵ)-secret sharing scheme, (Share, Rec) is ϵ ′ -leakage-resilient w.r.t. L if for each f ∈ L, and for any two messages a, b ∈ M, any distinguisher D with output in {0, 1}, the following holds :
consists of the family of all leakage functions of the form f = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ) and any index j ∈ [n]. Specifically, for the chosen j ∈ [n], the function f j on input share j outputs the whole share j . While for each i ∈ [n] \ {j}, function f i computes an arbitrary function of input share i and outputs at most µ bits.
Main result for individual tampering.
Theorem 3.3. For any message space M, any threshold t ≥ 2, any number of parties n ≥ t, if we have the following primitives :
(1) For any ϵ 1 ≥ 0, let (NMEnc, NMDec) be any coding scheme that is ϵ 1 -non-malleable w.r.t. F split 2
, which encodes an element of M into two elements of F 1 .
(2) For any ϵ 2 ≥ 0, let (TShare t n , TRec t n ) be any (t, n, ϵ 2 )-secret sharing scheme that shares an element of F 1 into n elements of
, that shares an element of F 1 into n elements of F 3 . then there exists (t, n, 2ϵ 1 +ϵ 2 )-secret sharing scheme that is (2ϵ 1 + ϵ 2 +ϵ 3 )-non-malleable w.r.t. F split n . The resulting scheme, (NMShare t n , NMRec t n ), shares an element of M into n shares where each share is an element of (F 2 × F 3 ). Furthermore, if the three primitives have efficient construction, then the constructed scheme is also efficient.
Proof. In case threshold t is equal to two, we use the a simple scheme constructed in the full version. Otherwise, we give our construction of (NMShare t n , NMRec t n ) : (1) Sharing Function(NMShare t n ) On input a secret m ∈ M, encode m using the encoding procedure of the non-malleable code. Let l, r ← NMEnc(m). Use the sharing procedure TShare t n to share l. Let ((l 1 , . . . , l n ) ← TShare t n (l). Use the sharing function of the leakageresilient secret sharing scheme to share r . Let (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ← LRShare 2 n (r ). For each i ∈ [n], construct the i th share of our scheme as follows : share i = (l i , r i ). Output (share 1 , . . . , share n ) (2) Reconstruction Function(NMRec t n ) Without loss of generality assume that the authorized set T has exactly t elements, as we only use the first t elements of T and can ignore all other shares. Let {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t } be ordered indices of T such that i j < i j+1 for each j ∈ [t − 1]. On input the shares ⊗ i ∈T share i , for each i ∈ T , parse share i as (l i , r i ). Run the reconstruction procedure TRec t n on t shares of l, to obtain l ← TRec t n (⊗ i ∈T l i ). Run the reconstruction procedure of the leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme on the first two shares of r , to obtain r ← LRRec 2 n (r i 1 , r i 2 ). Decode l and r using decoding process of underlying non-malleable code to obtain : m ← NMDec(l, r ). Output m.
Let us show that (NMShare t n , NMRec t n ) as constructed above satisfies the three properties required for a non-malleable secret sharing scheme :
Correctness and Efficiency : Trivially follows from the construction.
Statistical Privacy : We prove statistical privacy using hybrid argument. For ease of understanding, let share i be of the form al i , ar i when the secret a is encoded by the sharing procedure NMShare t n . Similarly, let share i be of the form bl i , br i when the secret b is encoded. Let U be an unauthorized set containing less than t indices. We describe the hybrids below :
(1) Hybrid 1 : for each i ∈ U , share i is of the form al i , ar i . The distribution of these shares is identical to distribution obtained on running the NMShare t n on input a. Output ⊗ i ∈U share i . (2) Hybrid 2 : Sample the shares as in Hybrid 1 , the previous hybrid. For each i ∈ U , replace al i with bl i to obtain share of the form bl i , ar i . Output ⊗ i ∈U share i . (3) Hybrid 3 : Sample the shares as in Hybrid 2 , the previous hybrid. For each i ∈ U , replace ar i with br i to obtain share of the form bl i , br i . The distribution of these shares is identical to distribution obtained on running the NMShare t n on input b. Output ⊗ i ∈U share i .
It follows from the statistical privacy of the scheme (TShare t n , TRec t n ) that for any pair of secrets a, b ∈ M, any unauthorized set U , the statistical distance between Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 is at most ϵ 2 . Claim: For any pair of secrets a, b ∈ M, any unauthorized U , the statistical distance between Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3 is at most 2ϵ 1 . Proof: Assume towards contradiction that there exists a, b ∈ M, an unauthorized set U , and a distinguisher D that is successful in distinguishing the hybrids with probability greater than 2ϵ 1 . We use distinguisher D to construct another distinguisher D 1 which violates the property of statistical privacy satisfied by the underlying non-malleable code for the message pair a and b, as proved in Lemma 3.1.
The distinguisher D 1 is defined as follows : On input a share r , run the sharing function of the leakage-resilient scheme to obtain r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n ← LRShare 2 n (r ). Sample ⊗ i ∈U share i according to Hybrid 2 . For each i ∈ U , replace ar i with r i in share i to obtain a share of form al i , r i , bp i . Invoke the distinguisher D with the modified ⊗ i ∈U share i and output its output.
Notice, in the case r was sampled while encoding a, then D will be invoked with input distributed according to Hybrid 2 . Otherwise, it will be invoked with distributed according to Hybrid 3 . Therefore the success probability of D 1 will be equal to the advantage of D in distinguishing these two hybrids, which is greater than 2ϵ 1 . We have arrived at a contradiction to (2, 2ϵ 1 )-secret sharing of (NMEnc, NMDec).
■ By repeated application of triangle inequality, we get that for any a, b ∈ M, any unauthorized U containing less than t shares, the statistical distance between Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 3 is at most 2ϵ 1 + ϵ 2 . This proves the statistical privacy of our scheme.
Statistical Non Malleability : To prove non malleability of the current secret sharing scheme, we need to give a simulator for every admissible tampering attack on the scheme. To this end, we transform an admissible tampering attack on the current scheme into an equivalent split-state attack on the underlying non-malleable code. We know by the properties of the non-malleable code, that for every split-state tampering attack there exists a simulator whose output distribution is similar to the one obtained in real tampering experiment. We use the simulator of the underlying non-malleable code as the simulator of our scheme, and the non malleability of our scheme follows from the equivalence of the tampering attacks. Now we present the formal proof.
As the adversary belongs to F split n , it specifies a set of n tampering functions {f i : i ∈ [n]}. All these functions act on their respective shares independently of the other shares, i.e. every f i takes share i as input and outputs the tampered share i . We can also assume without loss of generality that all these tampering functions are deterministic, as the computationally unbounded adversary can compute the optimal randomness. Further, we can also assume that adversary chooses an authorized set T that contains exactly t indices, as we will only use the first t shares for reconstruction. Let T = {i 1 , i 2 . . . i t } be an ordered set of t indices, such that i j < i j+1 .
We now give the formal reduction, in which we use the tampering functions {f i : i ∈ T } that tamper with the shares of our scheme (NMShare t n , NMRec t n ) to create explicit tampering functions F and G that tamper with the two parts of non-malleable code. Recall that as F split 2 allows arbitrary computation, the functions F and G are allowed to brute force over any finite subset.
(1) (Initial Setup) : Fix l $ and r $ encoding any m $ ← NMDec(l $ , r $ ). Run the sharing function TShare t n with input l $ to obtain ⊗ i ∈[n] tl i . Run the sharing function LRShare 2 n (r $ ) to obtain ⊗ i ∈[n] tr i . For each i ∈ [n], create tShare i as tl i , tr i . For each i ∈ T \{i t }, run f i on tShare i to obtain tShare i ← f i (tShare i ).
Parse tShare i as tl i , tr i . Fix l i ← tl i and l i ← tl i . For the last share corresponding to index i t , fix r i t ← tr i t .
(2) The tampering function F(l) is defined as follows : On input l, sample the value of l i t such that the shares {l i : i ∈ T } hide the secret l and the distribution of sampled l i t is identical to the distribution of l i t produced on running TShare t n with input l conditioned on fixing {l i : i ∈ T \ {i t }}. In case such a sampling is not possible, then abort. Otherwise, construct share i t as l i t , r i t using the fixed value of r i t . Run the tampering function f i t on share i t to obtain tampered share i t . Parse share i t as l i t , r i t . Run the reconstruction function TRec t n with input ⊗ i ∈T l i to obtain l. Output l.
(3) The tampering function G(r ) is defined as follows : On input r , sample the values of t − 1 shares of r , namely {r i : i ∈ T \ {i t }} satisfying the following constraints :-• The t shares, namely, {r i : i ∈ T } should be distributed according to the distribution of output of LRShare 2 n on input r . In other words, these shares should correspond to the t shares of the scheme (LRShare 2 n , LRRec 2 n ), in which any two of these shares can be used to reconstruct r .
• For each i ∈ T \ {i t }, let share i be l i , r i , run f i on share i to obtain share i . Parse share i as nl i , nr i . The value of nl i should be equal to l i (the value that was fixed in the initial step of reduction). In case such a sampling is not possible, then abort. Otherwise, run the reconstruction procedure of the leakageresilient scheme to obtain r , using the tampered values of first 2 shares of r . That is r ← LRRec 2 n {i 1 ,i 2 } ( nr i 1 , nr i 2 ) . Output r .
The reduction given above creates t shares corresponding to indices in T . To ensure the sanity of t tampering functions, we need to prove that for a given l and r , the distribution of the t shares created by the reduction is statistically close to the distribution of t shares which are obtained on running NMShare t n conditioned on output of NMEnc(m) being l, r . Otherwise, the tampering functions may detect a change in distribution and stop working.
We achieve this using a hybrid argument described below. For ease of understanding, let share i be of the form al i , ar i when the shares are produced by the reduction on input l and r , with the fixing of l $ and r $ . Similarly, let share i be of the form bl i , br i when the secret m is encoded by the sharing procedure NMShare t n conditioned on output of NMEnc(m) being l, r .
(1) Hybrid 1 : for each i ∈ T , share i is of the form al i , ar i . The distribution of these t shares is identical to distribution of the shares produced by the reduction on input l and r , with the fixing of l $ and r $ . Output ⊗ i ∈T share i . The distribution of these t shares is identical to distribution obtained on running the NMShare t n conditioned on output of NMEnc(m) being l, r . Output ⊗ i ∈T share i .
Claim: For any l, l $ , any authorized set T containing t indices, the statistical distance between Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 is at most ϵ 2 . Proof: The two hybrids differ in the initial setup phase. In Hybrid 1 , t − 1 shares of l $ are fixed, while in Hybrid 2 t − 1 shares of l are fixed. To violating the statistical secrecy of TShare t n , we assume towards contradiction that the t shares created by our reduction in the two hybrids are not statistically close, and there exists a l, l $ and there exists a distinguisher D which differentiates the two distributions with probability greater than ϵ 2 . In this case, we create a distinguisher D 1 which violates the statistical privacy property of TShare t n mentioned above. More formally, given a set of t − 1 shares of l or l $ , namely l i 1 , . . . , l i t −1 , the new distinguisher D 1 uses these l i 1 , . . . , l i t −1 , instead of running TShare t n on l $ in the initial setup phase and proceeds in a manner similar to Hybrid 1 . Then it invokes the distinguisher D with the sampled shares and outputs it output. Notice, in case l i 1 , . . . , l i t −1 encoded the message l $ , we are in a distribution identical to Hybrid 1 . Otherwise, if they encoded the secret l, we are in Hybrid 2 . Therefore, the distinguishing advantanges are of both the distinguishers is the same, and we have arrived at the contradiction of statistical privacy of (t, n, ϵ 2 )-secret sharing scheme (TShare t n , TRec t n ). ■
The above also shows that the function F in the reduction aborts with probability less than ϵ 2 . Claim: For any r, r $ , any authorized set T containing t indices, the statistical distance between Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3 is at most ϵ 3 . Proof: Assume towards contradiction that there exists r , r $ ∈ F 1 , and a distinguisher D that is successful in distinguishing Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3 with probability greater than ϵ 3 . We use distinguisher D to construct another distinguisher D 1 and a leak function g ∈ L split µ which violates the property of leakage-resilience satisfied by the scheme (LRShare 2 n , LRRec 2 n ) for the secrets r , r $ . The reduction is described below :
(1) (Initial Setup) : Run the sharing function TShare t n with input l to obtain
(2) (Leak function g) : We define a specific leakage function g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) which leaks independently from the n shares.
• For each i ∈ [n] \ T , define g i as a vacuous function that takes as input r i and outputs 0 bits.
• Define g i t as identity function, it outputs the whole r i t .
• For each i ∈ T \ {i t }, define g i as the following function. Create tShare i as l i , r i . Run f i on tShare i to obtain tShare i ← f i (tShare i ). Parse tShare i as tl i , tr i . Output tl i .
As tl i is an element of F 2 , it can be represented by at most log |F 2 | bits, which is equal to µ. This shows that the above leak function g belongs to the class L split µ which allows one share to be fully leaked and µ bits of leakage from each of the other shares.
(3) (Distinguisher D 1 ) : The distinguisher D 1 is defined as follows : On input g(r 1 , . . . , r n ), parse it as tl i 1 , tl i 2 , . . . , tl i t −1 , r i t . For each i ∈ T \ {i t }, fix l i ← tl i . For the last share corresponding to index i t , fix r i t . This completes the initial setup of our original reduction. Now invoke F with input l and G with input r to create the set of t shares, namely {share i : i ∈ T }. Invoke the distinguisher D with these t shares and output its output.
Notice, in the case the secret hidden by the leakage-resilient scheme was r $ , D will be invoked with input distributed according to Hybrid 2 . In the other case, in which r was hidden, D will be invoked with distributed according to Hybrid 3 . Therefore the success probability of D 1 will be equal to the advantage of D in distinguishing these two hybrids, which is greater than ϵ 3 by assumption. Hence, we have arrived at a contradiction to statistical leakage-resilience property of the scheme (LRShare 2 n , LRRec 2 n ). ■
The above also shows that the function G in the reduction aborts with probability less than ϵ 3 .
Claim: For any l, r , Hybrid 3 is identical to Hybrid 4 . Proof: In Hybrid 3 , the shares of r $ that are sampled in the initial setup already encode the value r (as r $ = r ). Recall that these shares are used for fixing the tampered shares of l, but now as the unfixed shares of r $ are already from the correct distribution, the tampering function G(r ) can trivially use the same shares, and all the leakages (deterministic function computing tampered shares ofl) will be trivially satisfied. Similarly, F(l) can use the value of unfixed share tl i t , because the t shares of l already encode l ( as l $ = l in Hybrid 3 ).
(Basically, (F, G) will be always successful in finding such satisfying shares by brute-force.) Therefore, all the t shares created in Hybrid 3 will be identically distributed to the ones produced while executing NMShare t n with the output of NMEnc being (l, r ). ■ By repeated application of triangle inequality, we get that for any a, b ∈ M, the statistical distance between Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 4 is at most ϵ 2 + ϵ 3 . This proves that the set of shares created by our reduction is statistically close the set of shares created during the real sharing by the scheme, and thus the tampering functions f = {f i : i ∈ T } can be successfully invoked.
From our construction of F and G, it is clear that for any l and r , if the reduction is successful in creating the t shares, then the secret hidden is these t shares is the same as the message encoded by l and r (under non-malleable code). That is,
Similarly, we can say that the secret hidden is the t tampered shares is the same as the message encoded by tamperedl and tamperedr . That is, By the ϵ 1 -non malleability of the scheme (NMEnc, NMDec), we know that there exists a distribution D F,G such that
Using the underlying distribution D F,G as our distribution SD f,T we get our simulator. Applying triangle inequality to the above relations we prove the statistical non malleability of our scheme. . The sharing function of the constructed scheme shares a m bit secret into n shares such that the length of each share is O(nm log m) bits with error ϵ = n2 −Ω(m) .
Proof. If threshold t is greater than two, we instantiate the primitives in theorem 3.3 using the following constructions :
(1) We use split-state non-malleable code constructed by Li [24] (LiNMEnc, LiNMDec). LiEnc encodes a m bit message to two shares each of length k ← O(m log m) bits and has error ϵ 1 = 2 −Ω(m) . We set ϵ 1 = ϵ 2 . (2) We use the t-out-of-n Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] (TShare t n , TRec t n ). The sharing function TShare t n shares a k bit secret into n shares each of size k bits. (3) We use the 2-out-of-n secret sharing scheme that is ϵ 3 -leakagereslient w.r.t. to L split µ and encodes a k bit secret into n shares, where each share has length O(nk), as constructed in the full version. We set ϵ 3 = ϵ
2
In case threshold t is equal to two, we instantiate the theorem 3.3 with the split-state non-malleable code constructed by Li [24] (LiNMEnc, LiNMDec) to arrive at our t-out-of-n non-malleable secret-sharing schemes. □
NON-MALLEABLE SECRET SHARING AGAINST JOINT TAMPERING
While our previous constructions allowed the adversary to tamper each share independently, in this section, we relax this requirement and construct t-out-of-n non-malleable secret sharing sharing schemes that allow the tampering of each share to depend on the values of multiple shares. In more detail, we want our non-malleable secret-sharing schemes to handle the following class of tampering functions.
Joint Tampering Family F joint t,n . For any t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme, the adversary chooses any t-out-of-n shares to obtain an authorized set T , partitions the set T into any two non-empty subsets which have different cardinalities 7 , and jointly tampers with shares in each of the two subsets arbitrarily and independently.
To construct such schemes we make black-box use of non-malleable codes that have a strong leakage-resilience property. We formally define the property that we need below, and construct non-malleable codes satisfying it in the full version 8 .
Definition 4.1. (Leakage-Resilient Non-Malleable Codes) Let M be any message space. Let (Enc, Dec) be any coding scheme, such that Enc : M → L × R encodes any message into two parts. Let Leak : R → {0, 1} µ be any leakage function that outputs µ bits of arbitrary information about its input. Similarly, let F : L × {0, 1} µ → L and G : R → R be any two tampering functions that arbitrarily uses its input to output the tampered parts (Without loss of generality, we can assume that all these functions specified by the adversary are deterministic, as the adversary being computationally unbounded can compute the optimal randomness). For any message m ∈ M, we define 7 We need the subsets to have different number of shares for our techniques to work. It is easy to see that if the threshold t is odd, or number of subsets is more than two, then such a requirement is trivially satisfied. 8 More general definition of multi-round leakage-resilient non-malleable codes can be found in the beautiful work of Aggarwal et al. [2] . Unfortunately, we cannot use their codes because of our leakage parameters. While it is possible to extend the number of rounds of leakage in our constructions (and definitions) (using known techniques of [2, 15, 16] ), for the sake of clarity of exposition, we restrict our model to only include one-round of leakage, as it suffices for arriving at goal of achieving joint-tampering. We now give the main result of this section. Theorem 4.2. Assume that for any message space M, any threshold t ≥ 2 , any number of parties n ≥ t, any ϵ > 0, there exists an efficient coding scheme (NMEnc,NMDec) that encodes a message m ∈ M into two shares in L × R and is (log(|L|) + log( 1 ϵ ))-leakage resilient ϵ-non-malleable (as defined in def 4.1).
Then there exists an efficient (t, n, 2ϵ)-secret sharing scheme that is 2ϵ-non-malleable w.r.t F joint t,n . The resulting scheme, (JNMShare t n , JNMRec t n ), shares an element of M into n shares, where each share is an element of L × R.
Proof. The case of threshold t = 2 follows from the previous theorem 3.3. Otherwise, we begin with defining our building blocks :
• Let (TShare t n ,TRec t n ) denote t-out-of-n Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] that shares an element of field L into n elements of L ( We can choose our non-malleable code such that L and R are fields and |L| > n as Shamir's secretsharing scheme needs it).
• Let k ← 1 + ⌊t/2⌋. Let (TShare k n ,TRec k n ) denote k-out-of-n Shamir's secret sharing scheme that shares an element of field R into n elements of R .
The construction of our scheme is given below : (1) Sharing Function(JNMShare t n ) On input a secret m ∈ M, encode m using the encoding procedure of the non-malleable code. Let l, r ← NMEnc(m). Use the sharing function of the t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme to share l. Let (l 1 , . . . , l n ) ← TShare t n (l). Use the sharing function of the k-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme to share r . Let (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ← TShare k n (r). For each i ∈ [n], construct the i t h share of our scheme as follows : share i = (l i , r i ). Output (share 1 , . . . , share n ) (2) Reconstruction Function(JNMRec t n ) Without loss of generality assume that the authorized set T has exactly t elements, as we only use the first t elements of T and can ignore all other shares. On input (share i 1 , . . . , share i t ), for each i ∈ T , parse share i as (l i , r i ). Verify that all the t shares of r , namely (r i 1 , . . . , r i t ) are consistent under kout-of-n Shamir's secret sharing scheme. In case this verification fails, output ⊥. Otherwise, reconstruct l by running the reconstruction procedure of the t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme, TRec t n on the t shares of l, namely, (l i 1 , . . . , l i t ). Reconstruct r by running the reconstruction procedure of the k-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme, TRec k n on the t shares of r , namely, (r i 1 , . . . , r i t ). Then decode l and r using decoding process of underlying non-malleable code to obtain : m ← NMDec(l, r) and output m.
Correctness, efficiency and statistical privacy : Correctness and efficiency trivially follows. A proof similar to one given for theorem 3.3 shows statistical privacy.
Statistical Non Malleability : The adversary specifies an authorized set T of cardinality t. As the adversary is in F joint t,n , it also specifies a partition A and B of T . Without loss of generality, let A be the set containing larger number of shares. In fact, by our choice of k, only A has at least k shares. The adversary also specifies the two tampering functions, namely F A and F B , corresponding to two subsets. That is, F A (resp. F B ) takes shares corresponding to set A (resp. B) and outputs their tampered versions.
We follow a similar proof strategy as of theorem 3.3, and use the tampering functions provided by the adversary to create explicit tampering functions of the underlying non-malleable code. While in the previous proofs, the tampering of the each part was independent of the value of the other part, it is no longer the case in our current construction. In fact, to create a tampering function for one of the parts, we need information about the other part. We obtain the required information, by giving explicit leakage-function which leaks from the other part, and use the output of leakage-function in giving explicit tampering function. The underlying non-malleable code has been strengthened to handle such leakages. We then argue that any attack on our non-malleable secret-sharing scheme corresponds to an equivalent tampering attack on the underlying leakage-resilient non-malleable code, and can use the latter's simulator in designing our simulator. Now we give the formal reduction which explicitly defines F, G, Leak.
(1) (Initial Setup): For each i ∈ A, fix l i randomly (this is okay, since A has less than t shares). For each, i ∈ B, fix r i randomly (this is okay, since B has less than k shares). Choose and fix randomness $ A , $ B and $ C uniformly and independently.
(2) (Sub-routine Error-Correcting Codes ECC): Let ECC : R |B | → {0, 1} p be any error-correcting code having distance p 2 . We will use randomness $ C to sample log( 1 ϵ ) random locations from the encoded string of length p. (Note that ECC need not be efficient as the reduction is allowed to perform arbitrary computations. Also, any constant distance would also work, we have chosen these parameter for the ease of exposition. One could even use Hadamard encoding.) (3) (Leak Function : Leak(r )) : On input r , use randomness $ A and the value of the fixed shares of r , namely {r i : i ∈ B}, to interpolate {r i : i ∈ A}. For each i ∈ A, create share i ← (l i , r i ) using the fixed l i . Run the tampering function F A on the set of shares {share i : i ∈ A} to obtain tampered shares { share i : i ∈ A}. For each i ∈ A, parse share j as l j , r j . Using the tampered shares of l compute the following :
where each α i is the coefficient for Lagrangian interpolation at 0 of the unique t − 1 degree polynomial passing through the points in set T (this can be seen as partial reconstruction of the t-out-of-n Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] where one obtains the secret as l ← i ∈A∪B α i × l i ).
If the tampered shares of r , namely { r i : i ∈ A}, are inconsistent under a k-out-of-n Shamir's secret sharing scheme, then let samples ← ⊥, otherwise use Shamir's secret sharing scheme interpolation operation to obtain the consistent values of the other tampered shares of r , namely { cr i : i ∈ B}. Now concatenate all these (interpolated) values to obtain a string cr ← cr i 1 • cr i 2 • . . .
• cr i |B | , where (i 1 , . . . , i |B | ) are ordered indices present in the set B. Encode the string cr ∈ R |B | using ECC to obtain cr ← ECC( cr ). Use randomness $ C to sample log( 1 ϵ ) locations from the binary string cr to obtain samples ← cr
Output (sum • samples).
(4) (Tampering function F(l, Leak(r ))): On input l and Leak(r ), interpolate the values of {l i : i ∈ B} using the input l, the fixed values of {l i : i ∈ A} and the fixed randomness $ B . Using the fixed value of {r i : i ∈ B} construct the shares {share i = (l i , r i ) : i ∈ B}. Run the tampering function F B on this set of shares to obtain { share j : j ∈ B}. For each {i ∈ B}, parse share j as l j , r j . Concatenate all the tampered shares of r , namely { r i : i ∈ B}, to obtain a string r B ← r i 1 • r i 2 • . . .
• r i |B | , where (i 1 , . . . , i |B | ) are ordered indices present in the set B. Encode the string r B ∈ R |B | using ECC to obtain r B ← RS( r B ). Use randomness $ C to sample log( 1 ϵ ) locations from the binary string r B to obtain samples B ← r B $ C Parse Leak(r ) as (sum • samples). If the string samples does not match the string samples B , then output ⊥, otherwise use the tampered shares of l to compute (and output) the following :
where α i is the Lagrangian's coefficient (as in the Leak(r ) function above).
(5) (Tampering function G(r )) : On input r , proceed as in leakage function Leak(r ) to compute tampered shares of r , namely { r i : i ∈ A}. Verify that all these tampered shares of r are consistent under k-out-of-n Shamir's secret sharing scheme. In case this verification fails, output ⊥, otherwise reconstruct the tampered r by running TRec k n on { r i ∈ A}. Output r .
This completes the description of our reduction. Now we show that the reduction creates shares from the correct distribution. As the number of fixed shares of l and r are less than the respective thresholds of t and k, on receiving the actual values of l and r , the remaining shares can be sampled from a distribution identical to the real sharing experiment (from perfect secrecy of Shamir's secret sharing scheme). It is also clear that if some message is hidden in the challenge (l, r ) (under the non-malleable code) then the same message is hidden in the t shares created by our reduction (under our non-malleable secret sharing scheme). As the distribution of the t shares created in the reduction is identical to the distribution in real-experiment, we can successfully invoke the tampering functions, namely F A and F B , on these t shares. Now let us argue that the secret hidden in our t tampered shares (under our secret-sharing scheme) will almost always be equal to the message hidden by l ← F(l, Leak(r )) and r ← G(r ) (under non-malleable code). This will establish that the two tampering attacks are equivalent, and will allow us to use the simulator of the non-malleable code while creating our simulator. Notice that we used the same randomness $ A to sample the shares of r to ensure consistency in between the functions Leak and G.
In case the t tampered shares of r , namely { r i : i ∈ T } , are consistent under a k-out-of-n Shamir's secret sharing scheme, then any k shares can be used for reconstructing r . In particular, in this case, the value of r ← G(r ) will be equal to the value of r calculated while executing JNMRec t n , the reconstruction procedure of our non-malleable secret-sharing scheme. Moreover, in this case, as sum = i ∈A α i × l i , the value calculated by F(l, Leak(r ))) can be interpreted as l ← i ∈A α i × l i + i ∈B α i × l i . On observing that the sets A and B are disjoint, we get that i ∈A α i × l i + i ∈B α i × l i = i ∈A∪B α i × l i . The latter expression is identical to the reconstruction formula for t-out-of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, which is used in JNMRec t n . Therefore, in this case, both l and r calculated by our reduction equals the values obtained while executing JNMRec t n on the t tampered shares.
Now we argue the trickier case, in which the t tampered shares of r are inconsistent and therefore JNMRec t n always outputs ⊥. If the inconsistency is in the shares of subset A, then the function G trivially detects it and outputs ⊥. Otherwise, the inconsistency is introduced because of the tampered shares of r in set B. In such a case, we use properties of Error-correcting coding scheme ECC to argue that the tampering function F outputs ⊥ with probability at least 1 − ϵ. As ECC has distance p 2 , for any two different inputs, the encoded outputs will differ in at least p 2 out of p locations. Now if we randomly sample one of these p locations, we will hit a location for which the two encodings differ with probability at least 1 2 . By repeating with uniform randomness ($ C ), the probability that we would pick at least one differing location in log( 1 ϵ ) independent repetitions is at least 1 − ϵ. Therefore, if the strings cr and r B differ, then with probability at least 1 − ϵ, the strings samples and samples B will not match and the tampering function F will output ⊥. Otherwise, with probability at most ϵ, our reduction fails to detect a ⊥ and outputs valid values of tampered l and r . Therefore, overall the statistical distance in between message encoded between l and r constructed by reduction and the secret computed by the reconstruction JNMRec t n can be at most ϵ.
We can now say that the tampering experiments for the nonmalleable secret-sharing schemes (see definition 2.6) and the underlying leakage-resilient non-malleable codes (see definition 4.1) are statistically indistinguishable, specifically, We use the simulator of the underlying non-malleable code as the simulator of our non-malleable secret sharing scheme. That is, we let SSim By applying triangle inequality to above relations we complete the proof of non-malleability. 
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